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DYNAMIC HIGHER ORDER EXPECTATIONS
KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK
Abstract. In models where privately informed agents interact, agents may need to form
higher order expectations, i.e. expectations of other agents' expectations. This paper de-
rives properties of higher order expectations in a linear-Gaussian setting where it is com-
mon knowledge that agents form expectations rationally. The usefulness of the approach is
demonstrated by solving Singleton's (1987) dynamic asset pricing model with disparately
informed traders but without assuming that shocks can be observed perfectly with a lag.
Under the same parameter restrictions that guarantee that a solution exists under full infor-
mation, the impact of expectations can be shown to decrease with the order of expectation.
This allows for a nite dimensional equilibrium representation that can be made arbitrar-
ily accurate. The method is generally applicable to linear-Gaussian rational expectations
models with private information.
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1. Introduction
Most economic models involve some type of interaction between multiple agents where the
payo of one agent depends not only on the actions taken by him, but also on the actions
taken by other agents. When agents' preferences and environment are identical and all share
the same information, an individual agent can infer the actions that others will take by
introspection, since all agents will choose the same action in equilibrium. If agents have access
to dierent information, this is no longer possible since individual agents cannot know with
certainty what other agents know and therefore also not know with certainty what actions
they will take. It then becomes necessary for agents to form expectations about the actions
of others. Additionally, to predict the behavior of agents that form expectations about the
actions of others, one need to form expectations about other agents' expectations about the
actions of others, and so on, leading to the well-known innite regress of expectations.
1 The
idea that agents observe dierent pieces of information has a lot of appeal and has been
applied to a variety of settings, including general equilibrium models of the business cycle
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1Townsend (1983) and Sargent (1991).
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and asset pricing models.
2 However, as a consequence of the innite regress problem one
could characterize most existing models of private information and strategic interaction as
eorts to avoid modeling higher order expectations explicitly, and instead nd alternative
representations where higher order expectations do not occur as state variables. Notable
exceptions are Woodford (2002), Morris and Shin (2002) and Adam (forthcoming) who by
restricting their attention to models of static decisions are able to analyze higher order
expectations explicitly. This paper explores the properties of higher order expectations in a
setting where agents make dynamic choices and shows how such models can be solved in a
linear setting with an explicit role for higher order expectations.
Throughout the paper, it is assumed that it is common knowledge that agents form expec-
tations rationally. That is, all agents know that all agents know, and so on that, all agents
form optimal expectations given their information sets. Common knowledge of rationality
gives enough structure to allow any order of expectation at any horizon to be determined
recursively.
3
We also use the structure imposed on expectations by common knowledge of rationality
to dene an average expectations operator. In the context of Singleton's (1987) asset pricing
model with disparately but symmetrically informed investors, the operator is used to compute
the equilibrium price of the asset. The usefulness of the operator comes from the fact that
it allows us to iterate Euler equations with `average expectations' terms forward in time
without relying on the law of iterated expectations. The solved price equation then resembles
a discounted sum of expected future fundamentals.
Deriving the dynamics of higher order expectations does not solve the problem of how to
model the innite regress of expectations in practise. Again in the context of Singleton's
(1987) model, we prove two important results towards this end. First, we show analytically
that the impact of expectations on the price of the asset decreases as the order of expectation
increases.
4 This result holds under the same conditions that guarantee that a solution exists
when agents are perfectly informed, i.e. that the eigenvalue of the fundamental process
multiplied by the discount rate is smaller than unity in absolute value. Second, we prove
that the approximation error introduced if one considered only a nite number of orders of
expectations converges to zero as the maximum order of expectation considered increases.
The dynamics of an innite horizon model with private information and with agents that
optimize intertemporally can thus be approximated to an arbitrary accuracy by a nite state
representation.
The results described above are derived without relying on the common strategy of making
additional assumptions to ensure that private information is short lived. One way to make
private information short-lived is to impose that all shocks are observed perfectly by all agents
with a lag. This assumption was rst introduced by Townsend (1983) as a way to restrict
the dimension of the relevant state for `forecasting the forecasts of others'. Before Townsend,
2Some examples are Townsend (1983), Sargent (1991), Woodford (2002), Lorenzoni (2005), Bacchetta and
Van Wincoop (2005), Kasa, Walker and Whiteman (2006) and Cespa and Vives (2007).
3A similar assumption is used implicitly in the static decision models of both Woodford (2002) and Morris
and Shin (2002) to construct higher order expectations of the current state of the economy.
4A result with similar implications for a strategic one period game without endogenous signals can be
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Lucas (1975) assumed that the inhabitants of his island economy pooled their information
between periods in order to circumvent the innite regress problem. More recently, Bacchetta
and van Wincoop (2006) used a similar assumption to Townsend, to analyze exchange rate
dynamics. In their model, fundamentals are perfectly observed contemporaneously, but
individual investors receive a private signal of future fundamentals. Together with projection
techniques, short lived information makes it possible to solve dynamic models with private
information, but may result in kinks in the impulse response functions at the lag when shocks
become common knowledge. In many settings it is also arguably unrealistic to assume that
the shocks can ever be observed, not even with very long lags.
Other strategies to restrict the state dimension can be found in for instance Allen, Morris
and Shin (2006) who set up a nite horizon model to investigate the eects of private
information on the price of an asset with a terminal liquidation date. Cespa and Vives
(2007) introduce long-term traders in a model that resembles that of Allen, Morris and
Shin (2006). Lorenzoni (2006) presents a dynamic general equilibrium model where agents
are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks and need to infer aggregate productivity to
optimally choose consumption. The model is used to explain the origin of demand shocks.
Lorenzoni assumes that an observation far enough in the past is uninformative and truncates
the state space in the time domain.
A dierent approach to solve a dynamic model with private information, that does not rely
on restricting the dimension of the state, is taken by Kasa, Walker and Whiteman (2006).
They present a simple asset price model with risk neutral traders where the fundamentals of
the asset are driven by two mutually orthogonal stochastic processes. Traders are divided into
two `types' depending on which of the stochastic processes that they can observe. Both types
observe the equilibrium price. Kasa et al then derive conditions for when the observation
of the equilibrium price does or does not reveal the information held by the other type of
trader. They also show how a solution can be found analytically, which is made possible
by conducting the analysis entirely in the frequency domain. It is not clear whether their
approach can be generalized to a setting with a large number of traders (or types) or where
traders receive information about the same underlying process, i.e. a setting with non-
orthogonal private signals, but it does oer some analytical elegance.
The frequency domain methods have recently been extended by Rondina and Walker
(2010) who show that for carefully chosen process for fundamentals, endogenous variables
can display waves of optimism and pessimism. Their method is particularly suited to models
where there is a nite order MA component and the number of signals observed by a=gents
is the same as the number of shocks in the fundamental process. In contrast, the method
proposed here is suitable for the more common ltering problem with more shocks than
observables, so that non-invertibility of the equilibrium process is guaranteed. That is, there
are no parameter congurations that make the state an invertible function of observables,
as long as enough shocks have strictly positive variance.
It was the paper by Townsend (1983) that coined the popular term 'forecasting the fore-
casts of others' to describe the innite regress problem discussed above. In an ironic twist
to the history of the topic, subsequent research, i.e. Kasa (2000) and Pearlman and Sar-
gent (2005), have showed that in the model studied by Townsend, private information is
not preserved when agents observe equilibrium prices so there is actually no need for agents4 KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK
to 'forecast the forecasts of others'. Walker (2007) shows that when the information set
of the traders in Singleton's model is enlarged to include one of the shocks that are latent
in Singleton's original model, equilibrium prices reveal the other latent state perfectly. In
general, private information is preserved in Singleton's model, but we show that a special
case, when one of the fundamental shocks have zero variance, replicates the result of Walker,
so that all order of expectations collapses to a single value coinciding with the true value of
the fundamental.
The next section denes the mathematical space the analysis will take place in as well as
denes notation for dynamic higher order expectations. This is followed by a brief presen-
tation of Singleton's model, that will serve as a vehicle for the rest of the paper. Section
4 derives properties of higher order expectations that must hold in any equilibrium. Par-
ticularly, it here that we show that the variance of higher order expectation are bounded
by the variance of the true process. Section 5 introduces an average expectations operator
and shows how it can be used to compute the higher order expectation that determine the
equilibrium price of the asset. Section 6 contains the main results of the paper. It is here
that the approximation results are presented, demonstrating that a nite number of orders of
expectations are sucient for an arbitrarily accurate representation of equilibrium. Section
7 presents and algorithm to nd an equilibrium and proves that an equilibrium exists, under
general conditions. Section 8 presents properties of the solved model and shows that in
practise, only a low number of orders of expectations are necessary as equilibrium dynamics
converge rapidly as the maximum order of expectation is increased. Section 9 concludes,
partly by discussing the generality of the results.
2. Preliminaries
Before analyzing the dynamics of higher order expectations, it is necessary to invest a
little in notational machinery as well as to dene exactly what is meant by a higher order
expectation.
2.1. The inner product space L2. In the model presented in the next section, the signals
that traders observe and their expectations of fundamentals and endogenous variables are
elements of the inner product space L2, which we now dene.
Denition 1. (The inner-product space L2:) The inner product space L2 is the collection of
all random variables X with nite variance
EX
2 < 1 (2.1)
and with inner-product
hX;Y i  E (XY ) : X;Y 2 L
2 (2.2)
Denition 2. Let 
 be a subspace of L2: An orthogonal projection of X onto 
 , denoted
P
X, is the unique element in L2 satisfying
hX   P
X;!i = 0 (2.3)
for any ! 2 
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In a linear model with Gaussian shocks, conditional expectations are equivalent to orthog-
onal projections. The equality
E (X j 
) = P
X (2.4)
thus implies that the conditional expectations in the model share the properties of orthogonal
projections in L2:
2.2. Dening higher order expectations. There is a continuum of agents are indexed
by j 2 (0;1): Agent j's rst order expectation of a variable t 2 L2 conditional on his period
t information set 
t(j) is denoted as

(1)
t (j)  E [t j 
t(j)] (2.5)
The average rst order expectation 
(1)





E [t j 
t(j)] dj (2.6)































t  t (2.9)
Full information rational expectations implies that the variable t is common knowledge so
that t = 
(k)
t : k = 1;2;::: for all periods t. We call a sequence of expectations, for instance
from order zero to k, a hierarchy of expectations from order zero to k. Vectors consisting of














2.2.1. Expectations about future expectations. In later sections, it will prove useful to also
have a notation for average expectation held in period t of the average expectation held in
period t+1 of the value of a variable in period t+2, and so on. For that purpose, we dene





E [t+1 j 
t(j)] dj (2.11)
Similarly, the average expectation in period t of the average expectation in period t + 1 of


























3. The Singleton Asset Pricing Model
This section presents a version of the model of Singleton (1987) with disparately informed
traders that will serve as the vehicle for the argument of the rest of the paper. Singleton
presents and solves a number of models that dier slightly in their patterns of persistence and
assumed structural parameter values. In what he refers to as Models 1-7, the unobservable
fundamental process follows an MA(2) process and in Models 8-12 it follows an AR(1). In
this rst class of models, a nite dimensional state representation can be found without
making strong assumptions about the revelation of the shocks since a private signal about
a MA(2) process does not carry information that is useful for forecasts beyond a two period
horizon. Private information about an AR(1) process on the other hand is long lived. To
solve the second class of models, Singleton assumes that the innovations to the AR(1) process
are perfectly and publicly observed with a two period lag. This allows him to derive a nite
dimensional state representation. The rest of this paper uses the same set up as in Singleton's
Models 8-12 as a vehicle to show how dynamic models with private information can be solved
without assuming that the shocks to the hidden process ever become common knowledge.
3.1. Model Set Up. There is a continuum of competitive traders indexed by j 2 (0;1) who
at time t divide their wealth between a risky asset with price pt and coupon payment ct and
a risk free asset with return r. The wealth of trader j then evolves according to
wt+1(j) = zt(j)[pt+1 + ct+1]   [zt(j)pt   wt(j)](1 + r) (3.1)







and It(j) is the information set of trader j at time t (dened below). The coupon payments
follow the known autoregressive process











(E [pt+1 j It(j)]   (1 + r)pt) + (c +  ct)

(3.4)
where  is the conditional variance of (pt+1 + ct+1): The supply of the asset at time t, zs
t;
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yields the equilibrium price
pt = 
Z
E [pt+1 j It(j)] dj





 + (1 + r)
: (3.9)
For later reference, note that 0 <  < (1 + r)
 1 :
3.2. Traders' Information Sets. The basic structure of the model described above is
identical to Model 8-12 in Singleton (1987). Where this paper dier from Singleton's is in
the assumption on what traders can observe. In Singleton's paper the information set of
trader j at time t is given by
I
S
t = fst T(j);pt T;ct T : T  0;vt T;t T : T  2g (3.10)
where







Each trader observes the price of the asset, pt, and the coupon payment, ct, perfectly. The
persistent component t of the supply process is not perfectly revealed by the observation of
the price due to the unobservable transitory supply shock t: The transitory supply shock t
thus serves the same purpose here as the noise traders do in Admati (1985). Trader j also
observes a private signal st(j) of the persistent supply process t and it is due to the private
measurement error t(j) that the need to 'forecast the forecasts of others' arises. Singleton
uses a similar method to overcome the innite dimension of the state as Townsend (1983),
i.e. he assumes that the shocks to the supply process become known to all traders after a
nite number of periods (which in Singleton's case is after two periods). This allows for a
nite dimensional time series representation of the model.
While the assumption of public revelation of shocks with a lag is convenient from a model-
ing perspective, it is not an assumption that is always realistic. We want to solve the model
without imposing that all shocks are observed perfectly after a nite number of periods. The
information set of our trader is therefore given by
It(j) = fst T(j);pt T;ct T : T  0g (3.12)
Traders thus form expectations about the future price of the asset by observing the private
signal st(j), the commonly observable price pt and the coupon payment ct. It is common
knowledge that all traders choose their portfolio to maximize (3.2) subject to the structural
equations (3.3) - (3.6).
3.3. The full information solution. To solve the model we need to integrate out the
average expectations term
R
E [pt+1 j It(j)] dj from equation (3.8): Under full information,









kE (t+k j t)   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Using the law of iterated expectations, (3.13) then simplies to
pt =
 




t   t (3.14)
if j j < 1 and jj < 1:
3.4. A complication. With privately informed traders, we can still use forward substitution
of the Euler equation (3.8). This yields the equilibrium price as a function of higher order
expectations of future values of the persistent supply process t
pt =
 
1    







where we used the notation for higher order expectations of future values of t dened
in Section 2.2.1. The current price of the asset thus depends on the average expectation in
period t of t+1; the average expectation in period t of the average expectation in period t+1
of t+2 and so on. As has been noted before, e.g. Allen, Morris and Shin (2006), average
higher order expectations, i.e. expectations about other agent's expectations generally dier
from average rst order expectations and we cannot use the law of iterated expectations
to integrate out the higher order expectations. To see why, note that the law of iterated
expectations can loosely speaking be attributed to that agents do not believe that they have
`incorrect' expectations so that they do not expect to revise their own expectations in a
particular direction. That is, rst order expectations are martingales. The same is not true
about expectations about other agents' expectations. For instance, an investor may believe
that the average `market expectation' of the fundamental value of an asset is incorrect, but
as more information becomes available to others over time the `market expectation' will be
revised towards what the investor believes is the asset's true value. It is the fact that it can
be rational to expect others to revise their expectations in a certain direction that makes
the law of iterated expectations inapplicable to higher order expectations. It is also this fact
that makes the dynamics of models with private information interesting.
3.5. The strategy. The rest of the paper is devoted to nding a nite dimensional repre-
sentation of the equilibrium price (3.15) of the form
pk;t = ak
(0:k)
t   t +
 
1    
ct (3.16)




are nite dimensional vectors. We thus need to show that the discounted sum of higher order
expectations of all future values of t in (3.15) can be approximated by a linear function of
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approximately holds. To do so, we will conjecture (and later verify) that there exists a law





t 1 + Nwt : wt  N(0;I) (3.18)
The solution will then consist of the equilibrium price (3.16) and the law of motion for the
state (3.18).
The plan from here on is the following. First we will derive some properties of higher order
expectations that must hold in any equilibrium. We then show how the price of the asset
can be expressed as a function of the conjectured law of motion (3.18). This will give the
problem enough of a structure so that it will be straight forward to show that there exists
representation with a nite number of orders of expectations that can be made arbitrarily
accurate. This results are quite general, in that they will hold under the same conditions
that guarantee that a stable solution exists under full information, i.e. that jj < 1:
4. Equilibrium properties of higher order expectations
It is possible to characterize some of the properties of higher order expectations using
only that it is common knowledge that agents are rational, in the sense that the model is
common knowledge. In this section we take the existence of an equilibrium as given, and
present some properties of higher order expectations that must hold in any equilibrium.
4.1. First order expectations. We start by establishing some properties of rst order
expectations. This may seem pedantic, since properties of rst order expectations are well
known. However, this will lay the groundwork for recursively deriving similar, but more
interesting, properties of higher order expectations. We start by dening a useful subspace
of L2:
Denition 3. The (closed) subspace 
t(j)  spfst T(j);pt T;ct T : T  0g is the space
spanned by the history of variables observed by trader j at period t. Projections onto 
t(j)
are denoted Pt;j:
From the projection theorem (e.g. Brockwell and Davis (2006) ) we then know that there
exist an element 
(1)






= 08!j 2 
t(j) (4.1)
that is, there exists a minimum variance expectation of t conditional on trader j's informa-
tion set. Given the linear structure of the model, past realizations of vt;t and t(j) form an
orthogonal basis for the subspace 
t(j): The conditional expectation E [t j 
t(j)] thus has
a representation of the form

(1)
t (j) = A(L)vt + B(L)t + C(L)t(j) (4.2)
where by the symmetry of traders, the (potentially innite order) lag polynomials A(L);
B(L) and C(L) are common across traders. Expectations will dier across traders only
because of dierent realizations of the idiosyncratic noise shocks t(j):10 KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK
4.2. The variance of rst order expectations. Here, the orthogonality property (4.1)
and the representation (4.2) will be used to prove that the variance of average higher order
expectations are bounded by the variance of lower order expectations. This result will later
be used for the approximation results in Section 6 as well as for the existence results in
Section 7. We start by showing that the variance of trader j's rst order expectations of t
is bounded by the variance of the actual process t:




















t (j) + "
(1)
t (j) (4.5)
The variance of the l.h.s. is E [t]
2 : By (4.1), the error "
(1)
t (j) is orthogonal to 
(1)
t (j) 2 
t(j)


































According to the representation (4.2), trader j0s expectation has both a common and
idiosyncratic component. The fact that the idiosyncratic component is orthogonal to the
common component allows us to prove our next result.










Proof. The representation (4.2) implies that the variance of trader j's rst order expectations








2 + E [B(L)t]




t(j)dj = 08t the average rst order expectation is simply

(1)
t = A(L)vt + B(L)t +
Z
C(L)t(j)dj (4.11)









2 + E [B(L)t]
2 (4.13)










2 + E [B(L)t]
2 + E [C(L)t(j)]
2 (4.15)
 E [A(L)vt]









gives the desired result where the third line follows from the fact that 0  E [C(L)t(j)]
2
and the last equality is from (4.13) 
4.3. Variance bounds for higher order expectations.
Proposition 1. The variance of higher order expectations of t are bounded by the variance













Proof. To prove the proposition, replace the denition of trader j's rst order expectations
error "
(1)





t (j)  "
(k)
t (j)
Noting that the k order error "
(k)
t (j) is orthogonal to 
(k)
t (j) 2 
t(j) allows for recursively
establishing the proposition for k = 2;3;:::by following the same steps as in the proofs of
Lemma 1 and 2. 
It is straightforward to extend this result to higher order expectations of future values of
t:
Proposition 2. The variance of higher order expectations of future expectations of t are













Proof. To prove the proposition, replace the denition of trader j's rst order expectations
error "
(1)









Again, since the k order error "
(k+1)




recursive procedure as in Proposition 1 can be applied to establish the desired result for
k = 1;2;3;::: 12 KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK
As noted above, these results will prove useful for the purpose of nding an accurate
solution to the model, but they also illustrates well how the assumption of common knowledge
of rational (i.e. model consistent) expectations allow us to derive properties of higher order
expectations. It is the fact that rst order expectations are formed rationally and that this
is common knowledge that allow us to derive the variance bounds above. In the absence
of common knowledge of model consistent expectations, we would have to make alternative
assumptions about how traders in the model believe that other traders form expectations
in order to determine how traders form second order expectations. Whether the variance
bounds derived above would hold or not, would then depend on the properties of the second
order beliefs about how other traders form expectations.
4.4. Properties of the law of motion for higher order expectations. Here, some





t 1 + Nwt : wt  N(0;I) (4.18)
are derived.
Proposition 3. Common knowledge of rationality and jj < 1 implies that maxjeig (M)j <
1
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Consider the case if maxjeigMj = 1: This implies























t cannot be the minimum variance estimate of 
(k0)
t since there then exist an






















Proposition 3 simply says that if the true state is a stable process, then the law of motion
for higher order expectations must also be a stable process. Proposition 3 could also be
proved as a direct corollary of Proposition 1 since the fact that higher order expectation has
a bounded variance also implies that maxjeig (M)j < 1.
Proposition 4. Each row of the matrix M in the law of motion (3.18) sum to .
Proof. First, note that common knowledge of rationality implies that if all order of expecta-
tions coincide so that
t = 
(k)
t : k = 1;2;::: (4.21)
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That is, if all agents are believed to agree about the current state of the world, common
knowledge of rationality then implies that there should also agreement about future expected
states of the world. Equating elements in (4.22) for s = 1 immediately gives the desired result
1 X
j=1
mi;j =  : i = 1;2;::: (4.23)
where mi;j is the element in the ith row and jth column of M. 
In this section, we have derived some properties of higher order expectations that must
hold in any equilibrium when it is common knowledge that traders form expectations ratio-
nally. Specically, we showed that the variance of higher order expectations are bounded
using orthogonality properties of expectation errors. While based on a simple insight, these
results will later turn out to be very useful for both deriving a accurate solution as well as
demonstrating that such a solution exists.
5. The equilibrium price
This section demonstrates how a simple matrix operator can be used to compute the
equilibrium price for a given law of motion of the hierarchy of higher order expectations.
The law of motion for the hierarchy of expectations is derived in the Section 7.
5.1. An average higher order expectations operator. To compute the higher order






That is, H applied to a hierarchy of expectations move the hierarchy one step up in order
of expectations. If the state of the economy is given by 
(0:1)
t then the average expectations
of the true state is given by H
(0:1)
t and the operator H thus annihilates the rst element






where I1 is the identity matrix.5
5.2. Equilibrium asset prices. We can now derive an explicit expression for the equilib-
rium price of the asset. Given the conjectured law of motion (3.18) and the higher order
expectations operator we can now compute the higher order expectations of the future values
of t in the forward iteration (3.15) of the price Euler equation (3.8).
The one step ahead average expectation of t is simply given by rst applying H to the
complete hierarchy of expectation to get the average expectation of the state and then apply
5Allen, Morris and Shin (2006) denes an average belief operator E : R2 ! R2: The operator E maps the
average k order expectations of the average signal vector into k+1 order expectations of the same vector and
can be used to compute higher order expectations of the state since the static setting results in a proportional
relationship between higher order beliefs. In our model, the elements of N in the law of motion (3.18) could
be generated by a similar operator if t was a non-persistent process.14 KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK
M to form the average expectation of the state in the next period. The average expectation
in period t of the value of persistent supply shock t is then given by
Z





where e1 is a vector with 1 in the rst element and zeros elsewhere. Using similar reasoning,



















Substituting (5.5) into (3.15) gives the equilibrium price pt as a function of the period t









t   t +
 
1    
ct (5.6)




6. A Finite Dimensional Approximation
In the previous sections, several properties of higher order expectations were derived that
must hold in equilibrium. Though some of these properties may be interesting per se, here
we show how they can be used to prove a practical result: The equilibrium characterized by
an innite number of orders of expectations can be approximated to an arbitrary accuracy
by a nite dimensional system. That is, for practical purposes, we do not need to consider
the complete hierarchy of expectation, but instead we can nd a maximum (and nite) order
of expectation that we need to consider, for any desired degree of accuracy. We denote this
maximum order of expectation k.
Two results are proved formally here. First, we show that the weight on higher order
expectations tend to zero as the order of expectation increases. Secondly, we show that the
approximation error variance tend to zero as we increase the maximum number of orders of
expectations k: These results are all derived using a similar technique. First, we dene an
innite series indexed by the number of orders of expectations. We then show that the series
converges. Since convergence of an innite series implies that the individual elements in
the sequence tend to zero (while the converse is not generally true), convergence of a series
indexed by the maximum order of expectation considered implies that the accumulative
eect of terms depending on orders of expectations higher than k tend to zero.
6.1. The diminishing impact of higher order expectations. The solved model will
deliver an expression for the equilibrium price pt as a function of the current hierarchy of
expectations about t of the form
pk;t = ak
(0:k)
t   t +
 
1    
ct (6.1)DYNAMIC HIGHER ORDER EXPECTATIONS 15
where ak is a row vector with elements dened as
ak 

a0 a1  ak

From the price equation (3.8) we already know that a0 =  . The next proposition
establishes that as k ! 1 the coecient ak tends to zero.
Proposition 5. For 0  jj < 1;there exists a nite number k such that
jak + ak+1 + ::: + ak+n 1 + ak+nj < " (6.2)
for any " > 0 and and k > k:
Proof. The result is an immediate implication of the fact that fakg
1
k=0 is a convergent
series, which we rst establish. To do so, we will use the fact that in the special case when
t = 
(k)
t = 18k the equilibrium price equals the sum of the elements in the row vector a:




the rows of MH




k  11 = 
k  1 : k = 0;1;2::: (6.3)
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t +
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Intuitively, if all orders of expectations coincide then the price must equal the full information
price (adjusted for the appropriate private information values of  and  which depend on
the conditional variance): To see why this implies that the sum
P1
k=0 ak converges, note that






















which is nite. Since the innite series (6.9) converges, there exists a number k such that
jak + ak+1 + ::: + ak+n 1 + ak+nj < " for all n  1 and k > k (6.10)16 KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK
(see for instance Ok 2007). 
Proposition 6 thus establishes that the coecients ak that multiply the k order expectation
in the conjectured solution tend to zero as the order of expectation increases, and that
this will hold under the same conditions that guarantee that a stable solution to the full
information model exists, i.e. that jj < 1:
6.2. The variance of the approximation error. Above, we demonstrated that the im-
pact of expectations on the price tend to zero as the order of expectations increases. Com-
bined with the fact that the variance of higher order expectations are bounded, one might
conjecture that the variance of the contribution of the higher order expectation to the price
also tend to zero as the order of expectation increases. Here, we will now demonstrate that
this is the case but using a more direct approach that does not involve using the result of
Proposition 6 above. Instead, we will dene a particular convergent series (again indexed by
k) so that the remainder of the sum corresponds to the variance of the approximation error.
Since the series converges, the remainder can be made arbitrarily small for large enough k:To
prove this result, we will need the following lemma.
Lemma 3. The variance of the price pt is nite.
Proof. The proof uses that the higher order expectations about future expectations of future
values of t in the price equation (3.15) are discounted by jj < 1 and have nite variances.
The complete proof can be found in the Appendix. 
Denition 4. The approximation error k associated with considering only k orders of
expectations is dened as




t   t +
 





t   t +
 












Proposition 6. The variance of the approximation error k tends to zero as k tends to
innity.
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If the limit exist we know that there exists a k such that
jz1   zkj < " : " > 0 (6.17)


































which equals the dierence between zk and its limit so that














To prove that the approximation error tend to zero as k increases it is thus sucient to show
that the sequence fzkg converges, i.e. that the limit z1 exists and is nite. Taking variances





































By Lemma 3 we know that the variance of the price is nite so that E [pt]
2 < 1 . This in
turn implies that each term on the right hand side of (6.21) also must be nite. Since the
rst term on the right hand side of (6.21) equals the limit z1 we know that fzkg converges.
There thus exists a nite k such that
E (k)
2 = jz1   zkj (6.22)
< " : 0 < " (6.23)
where the rst line follows from (6.18) - (6.20) and the second line follows from (6.17) and
the fact that fzkg converges. 
In this and previous sections we have derived properties of higher order expectations that
must hold in any equilibrium. We now turn to how such an equilibrium can be found in
practice.18 KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK
7. A Solution Algorithm
Solving the model implies nding the matrices M and N in the law of motion for the
hierarchy of expectations, the row vector a in the price equation and the conditional variance
: This section presents an iterative solution algorithm and shows that a solution exists.
There are three basics steps in each iteration (indexed by s) of the algorithm (i) For given
Ms and s; nd the row vector ak;s that maps the hierarchy of expectations into the price.
(ii) For given values of Ms;Ns;ak;s and s nd the new matrices Ms+1 and Ns+1 of the law
of motion of the hierarchy. (iii) For given Ms+1, Ns+1;ak;s and s nd the new conditional
variance s+1: These steps are described in detail below. This is followed by a proposition that
uses Brouwer's xed point theorem to prove that a xed point of the iteration on (i) - (iii)
exists under general conditions. From now on, all derivations pertain to a nite dimensional
approximation of the equilibrium. To simplify notation, subscripts indicating that vectors
and matrices are nite dimensional have been suppressed at instances where this will not
cause confusion.
7.1. Step 1: Computing the price. The rst step is to nd the price of the asset as a
function of the contemporaneous expectation hierarchy of the supply disturbance 
(0:k)
t for a
given law of motion of the hierarchy and a given conditional variance of (pt +ct); : That is,
we want to nd ak in
pt = ak
(0:k)
t   t +
 
1    
ct (7.1)












For a nite k and given Ms and s implies that ak;s is given by
ak;s =  sse
0
1 (I   sMsH)
 1 (7.3)
where we know that sMsH is stable matrix (since the variance of pt is nite). The price
function thus resembles a standard discounted expected sum of future fundamentals, but
where the coecient matrix M from the true law of motion is replaced with MH. The
relationship between M and MH is thus similar to that of physical and risk neutral dynamics
in the nance literature. Of course, the interpretation is dierent: Here, the asset is priced as
if the hierarchy was observed perfectly but followed a law of motion with transition dynamics
determined by MH.
7.2. Step 2: The dynamics of the expectation hierarchy. This section shows how to
nd the law of motion for the hierarchy of expectations (3.18) for a given vector ak and
conditional variance : The traders estimate the state of the model recursively, by applying
the Kalman lter to the current price and the private signal of the supply disturbance.
Computing the Kalman gain requires that the law of motion of the state that is being
estimated is known, so to compute the s + 1 iteration Ms+1 and Ns+1, \old" values Ms and
Ns are also needed.DYNAMIC HIGHER ORDER EXPECTATIONS 19
The state consists of the actual supply disturbance t and the hierarchy of expectations of
the supply disturbance 
(0:k)
t ; so the law of motion of the state is determined by the actual
supply process (3.6) and the law of motion of the higher order estimates. The Kalman lter
thus plays a dual role: it both determines traders' estimate of the state as well as the law of
motion of the very same state that the traders are estimating. To nd the updated law of
motion Ms+1 and Ns+1 we compute rst nd the recursive updating equation for trader j's
estimate of the hierarchy of higher order expectations conditional on the the previous law
of motion Ms and Ns: We then take averages of this recursive updating equation to nd the
new law of motion for the hierarchy of average expectations Ms+1 and Ns+1:
7.2.1. Trader j's estimate of the hierarchy. For given values Ms and Ns, the conjectured law
of motion for the hierarchy (3.18) and trader j's information set (3.12) can be written as a





t 1 + Nswt (7.4)
St(j) = Ls
(0:k)













where wt is a vector of aggregate shocks and wt(j) is the idiosyncratic shock to trader j's




























where subscript s indicates that a matrix may be changing at each iterative step in the
algorithm. Trader j estimates the hierarchy of contemporaneous expectations recursively,
using the Kalman lter updating equation

(1:k)
t (j) = Ms
(1:k)




t 1 (j)   Qct
i
(7.6)






































: Note that the s subscript on K and P denotes the step in
the solution algorithm, not the time period. For given Ms and Ns; we compute the time
invariant, or steady state, Kalman gain.
7.2.2. The average expectation hierarchy. We want to nd the conjectured vector AR(1) law
of motion (3.18) for the hierarchy of average contemporaneous expectations, that is, we
want to nd the matrices M and N. We thus need to integrate the state updating equation
(7.6) across traders and express all remaining terms as functions of the lagged expectation
hierarchy 
(0:k)
t 1 and the aggregate shocks wt: Use the denition of the private signal st(j)20 KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK
(3.11), the price equation (3.15) and that
R




t 1 + LsNswt + R1swt (7.9)
Substituting the average signal (7.9) into the updating equation (7.6) gives the law of motion
of the average of traders' estimate of the state

(1:k)




t 1 + (KsLsNs + KsR1s)wt (7.10)
The nal step to get the conjectured form (3.18) is to collect terms and append the actual
supply disturbance process
t = t 1 + vt (7.11)













































where the last row and/or columns of the matrices have been cropped to make the matrices
conformable (i.e. implementing the approximation that expectations of order k > k are
redundant, and therefore setting 
(k)
t = 0 : k > k). Equating coecients in (7.12) and (3.18)
























7.3. Step 3: The conditional variance. The conditional variance of (ct+1+pt+1); ; is the
variance of investors' forecast error of the sum ct+1+pt+1 based on their period t information
sets: The conditional forecast error is given by




















where b Ps is the one period ahead joint forecast error covariance matrix of t and the hierarchy
of expectations of t: Details on how to compute b Ps are given in the Appendix.
7.4. The existence of a xed point. Solving the model implies nding a xed point of
equations (7.3),(7.7),(7.8),(7.13),(7.14) and (7.15). We now prove the existence of such a
xed point using Brouwer's xed point theorem, which we rst restate.6
6The relevant version of Brouwer's xed point theorem is for compact subsets of Rn and is also known as
Kakutanis' xed point theorem.DYNAMIC HIGHER ORDER EXPECTATIONS 21
Lemma 4. (Brouwer xed point theorem) Every continuous map from a convex compact set
into itself has a xed point.
We thus need to show that iterating on Step 1 - 3 above is indeed a map from a convex com-
pact set into itself. In order to do so, we will redene the mapping fMs;Ns;ak;s;Ks;Lsg ! 
Ms+1;Ns+1;ak;s+1;s+1;Ks+1;Ls+1
	
described by Step 1 - 3 above in two ways.
First, note that for given Ms+1;Ns+1 and s+1 we can nd ak;s+1;Ks+1 and Ls+1 that do
not depend on ak;s;Ks and Ls. It is thus sucient to nd a xed point of the mapping
fMs;Ns;sg ! fMs+1;Ns+1;s+1g:
Secondly, we will redene the matrix M to an equivalent function of two covariance ma-
trices with known properties, i.e. matrices that belong to the convex compact set S; which
we now dene.








matrices  matrix with ithrow, jth
column element i;j such that ji;jj  E (2
t) : i;j = 1;2;:::;k + 1
Lemma 5. The matrix Ms can equivalently be expressed as a function of the matrices s



















where covs denotes the covariance conditional on the law of motion described by Ms and Ns:














i.e. Ms is given by +1;s 1
s : 
Lemma 6. The covariance matrices s and +1
s belong to S; that is, that all elements of
s and +1
s lie in the closed interval [ E (2
t);E (2
t)]:







denes a new law of
motion for the hierarchy (1:k)
t;s+1 that is the optimal estimate of the hierarchy (0:k)
t;s if (0:k)
t;s is
governed by the law of motion fMs;Nsg: We know that the variance of an optimal estimate














must hold for each iteration s. Starting from an initial guess of M0 and a N0 (for instance













: k = 1;2;::: (7.21)
ensures that
s 2 S;+1;s 2 S : s = 0;1;2;::: (7.22)22 KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK




































i.e. all elements of s and +1












t) : i = 1;2;:::;k + 1 and j = 1;2:
Lemma 7. The matrices Ns : s = 0;1;2::: in the iteration described by belong to N:
Proof. MssM0






is a positive semi-denite matrix. Since s 2 S for each iteration s; each element ns;ij of















The results then follows immediately the fact that the diagonal elements of s are non-
negative for positive semi-denite matrices. 
Denition 7. The set D is the closed interval [0;2
pc] on R where 2
pc is the upper bound of
the unconditional variance of pt + ct:
It follows immediately that s 2 D since the conditional variance is bounded by the
unconditional variance
E (pt + ct)
2  E (pt)







where the inequality follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and that both the price
and coupon payments have nite variances.
Proposition 7. The set Z  S  S  N  D is convex and compact and a xed point








Proof. For nite dimensional sets, compactness is equivalent to a set being closed and
bounded, so compactness follows directly from the denitions of S,N.and D: Convexity
follows from that if jxj  c and jzj  c then jxj + (1   )jzj  c: The existence of a xed
point follows from Lemma 4 - 7. DYNAMIC HIGHER ORDER EXPECTATIONS 23
In this section we have shown how a solution to the model can be found for a nite k: In
practice, we need to choose a maximum order of expectations to include in the representation
of the model. In the next section shows how this can be done by ensuring that the impulse
responses of prices changes have converged and thus remian unchanged as the maximum
order k is increased further.
8. Properties of the Solved Model
In this section, the properties of the model is explored in more detail. First, we give
an example of how the private information changes the price responses to supply shocks
in contrast to when the model is solved under full or imperfect but common information.
Secondly, we demonstrate how the representation of the equilibrium dynamics of the model
can be used to compute two dierent types of dispersion of expectations: (i) Dispersion of
expected returns across traders, and dispersion across orders of expectations. Both of these
types of dispersion may be of interest to quantify and it is straight forward to compute either
for a given parameterization of the model.
8.1. Dynamics. One question of interest is how private information aect the responses of
the asset's price to innovations to the supply of assets. In the row of Figure 1 below, we
have plotted the impulse response function of the price of the asset to an innovation to the
persistent component of supply (left column) and a to a transitory shock (right column).
For comparison, we have also plotted the impulse response to the same innovation under the
alternative assumptions of full information, i.e. the state is observed perfectly by all traders,
and imperfect but common information, i.e. it is common knowledge that all traders observe









f15;1;1:5;0:5;0:9;0:01;0:01;:1;0:001;1g. For the imperfect but common information case
we set the variance of the noise in the common signal to the same as the idiosyncratic noise
variance in the private information case.
The impulse of this parameterization is displayed in Figure 1 which demonstrates that
the dierent information structures imply very dierent price dynamics. Both private and
common imperfect information results in weaker initial responses to a persistent supply
shock compared to the full information case, with the trough appearing later with private
information than with imperfect but common information. Imperfect information also makes
the price response to a transitory shock persistent and the persistence is stronger with private
signals than with an equally precise common signal. 7
That private information can be a strong force of inertia in endogenous variables has
been noted before, e.g. Woodford (2002), Nimark (2008), Graham and Wright (2010) and
Angeletos and L'ao (2009). As rst pointed out by Woodford (2002) in a setting where
agents faced a dynamic ltering problem (but with static choices), it is the fact that higher
order expectations respond much more sluggishly to a shock than lower order expectations
7Indeed, Singleton found that what mattered most in his model was that agents had imperfect information,
rather than private information per se. An earlier version of this paper demonstrated that this was due to the
large variances of the innovations in the supply process in Singleton's calibration. Since the discount factor
 depends on the conditional variance of returns , absolute (and not only relative) variances of shocks
matter. Larger variances imply faster discounting of the higher order expectation in ().24 KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK



























































































Figure 1. Impulse responses of pt (top row) and 
(0:50)
t (bottom row) to in-
novation to persistent (left column) and transitory (right column) component
of supply.
that causes the inertial response of the endogenous variable. This is illustrated in the bottom
row of Figure 1 the responses of the hierarchy of expectations to the two shocks are plotted.
Average rst order expectations (k = 1) respond stronger than higher order expectations in
the impact period to both persistent and transitory shocks. That higher order expectation
respond less than lower order expectations is intuitive. First order expectation respond less
than the true shock on impact since some of the actual supply shock will be attributed to the
transitory shock. Since traders know that rst order expectations on average respond less
than the actual shock, second order expectations must respond less than rst order shock.
This argument can then be applied recursively to understand why a k +1 order expectation
responds less than a k order expectation in the impact period.
After a transitory shock t and for k  1; lower order expectations of t also respond more
strongly on impact. However, lower order expectations respond quicker to the higher than
expectated asset prices that follows the impact period and converge faster towards the true
shock (zero) than lower order expectations. The fact that this convergence of the (higher
order) expectations about t towards zero is not immediate that introduces some persistence
of the price response even to a transitory shock.DYNAMIC HIGHER ORDER EXPECTATIONS 25
8.2. Cross-sectional dispersion of expectations. Survey evidence suggest that market
participants may have dispersed expectations about future economic outcomes, e.g. Swanson
(2006) and Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers (2003). Private information is one way of introducing
such dispersion in a model and there are at least two reason why this may be of interest.
First, we may want to use quantitative information from for instance surveys to calibrate
the parameters of a model to match the measured dispersion of expectations. Secondly,
and as in Nimark (2010), computing the implied dispersion for a model with parameters
estimated using only aggregate variables, one can gauge the plausibility of the model by
judging whether the dispersion of expectations implied by the parameters that generate the
best t to aggregate variables is realistic. In the framework presented here, it is straight
forward to compute the cross-sectional dispersion of expectations.
The idiosyncratic noise shocks t(j) are white noise processes that are orthogonal to the
aggregate shocks vt and t: This implies that the cross-sectional variance of expectations is
equal to the unconditional variance of trader j's expectations that is due to idiosyncratic
shocks, which can be computed by nding the variance of the estimates in trader j's updating
equation (7.6), but with the aggregate shocks vt and t \switched o". The covariance j of
trader j's expectations due to idiosyncratic shocks is then given by
j = (I   KL)MjM





























The variance of price expectations s periods ahead is then given by
E

E [pt+s j 
t(j)]  
Z




















The cross sectional variance of expectations will generally depend on all the parameters
of the model, but some have a more direct inuence on the dispersion than others. For
instance, Figure 2 illustrates how the cross sectional variance of one period ahead price
expectations depends on the variance 2
 of the idiosyncratic noise shock t(j) (left panel)
and the variance 2
 of the transitory demand shock t (right panel). Both graphs start at
the origin, i.e. if either the variance of the idiosyncratic noise shocks or the transitory supply
shocks are zero, there is no dispersion of expectations. Of course, if there are no idiosyncratic
noise shocks, there is no private information since all traders observe t directly and without
error. Similarly, if there are no transitory supply shocks, traders can infer t perfectly from
observing the price pt and again, there is no private information in equilibrium. This result
is reminiscent of the result in Walker (2007) who uses a version of Singleton's model to show
that if one of the supply shocks is observed directly, equilibrium prices reveal the other shock
perfectly and there is then no role for private information.
While the limit case of zeros variance is similar for the two shocks in the gure, the change











































































Figure 2. Cross sectional variance of one period ahead price expectation.
shock is increased, dispersion of expectations rst increase as traders observe private signals
with increased dispersion. At some point though, the variance of the idiosyncratic noise
shocks become large enough so that the weight on the private signal decreases faster than
the variance of the noise increases. This explains the hump shape dependence of cross-
sectional dispersion on the variance 2
:
We do not see the hump shape in the right panel. The reason is that when the variance of
the transitory shock is increased, prices become more noise as signals about t and traders
tend to put more weight on their private signal st(j): Where the graph attens out, the price
is so noisy that traders do not put any weight on it when estimating t:
8.3. Dispersion across orders of expectations. The framework presented here can also
be used to compute a dierent type of dispersion of expectations, that is, when dierent or-
ders of expectations do not coincide. Unlike the cross-sectional dispersion, dispersion across
orders of expectations vary over time and gives rise to new dynamics. Indeed, it is the fact
that there is a divergence between orders of expectations that makes models with private
information to display dierent dynamics, as the full information rational expectations equi-
librium can be thought of as a special case when all orders of expectations coincide in every
period so that t = 
(k)
t : k = 1;2;:::for all t. As with cross-sections dispersion, the amount of
dispersion across orders of expectations depends generally on all the parameters in the model
but the variance of the transitory supply shock and the variance of the idiosyncratic noise
shock again play a more direct role. Figure 3 illustrates how the response of the hierarchy
of expectations of t from order zero to 50 to a unit innovation in t depend on the variance
of the transitory supply shock t: (Apart from 2
, the parameterization is the same as that
used for Figure 1.) The thick solid line is the response of the actual shock, or 
(0)
t , the dashed
line immediately beneath it is the rst order expectations, the dotted line next is the second
order expectation and so on. The transitory supply shock t functions as aggregate noise
that prevents the price from perfectly revealing t. If we decrease its variance, equilibrium
prices will be more informative about t and other traders' (higher order) expectations ofDYNAMIC HIGHER ORDER EXPECTATIONS 27





























k > = 0
Figure 3. Impulse responses of 
(0:50)
tjt to a unit innovation vt
t: This can be seen in the mid panel of Figure 5, where we have plotted a second impulse
response function for the hierarchy 
(0:50)
t : The variance of t in the mid panel is set to 1/10
of that in the top panel. It is clear that decreasing the variance of the transitory shock makes
all orders of expectations move closer together, i.e. making traders better informed about
all orders of expectations of t:
From a ltering perspective, setting the variance of t equal to zero is equivalent to making
it perfectly observable. The bottom panel demonstrates that the model with 2
 = 0 replicates
the result of Walker: Equilibrium prices perfectly reveal the value of t so that all orders of
expectations coincide and the graph collapses to a single line. However, this is not a general
property of Singleton's model, but an artefact of the additional assumptions that 2
 = 0, or
equivalently, that traders can observe t perfectly.28 KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK
8.4. Accuracy. In the previous section, we demonstrated that a nite number of orders of
expectations are sucient to accurately represent the equilibrium dynamics of the model.
In practice, a maximum order k need to be chosen such that we are condent that including
a larger number of orders of expectations would not change the dynamics of the model. The
number of orders of expectations required to accurately represent the equilibrium depends
on the parameters of the model and a decision of how many orders of expectations to include
have to be made on a case by case basis. Here, we illustrate that for both the row vector
ak and the impulse response functions to the aggregate shocks to converge, relatively few
orders of expectations are needed.
In Figure 4, the row vector ak is plotted for k = 1;3;:::10: We can see that the vector
converges quite rapidly. When 6 or 7 orders of expectations are included, adding higher
order expectations beyond that does not further alter the elements of ak: We Can also see
that the elements of akconverges quite rapidly towards zero, so that the Proposition 6, which
stated that the series fakg
1
k=0 converges , seems \bite" already for relatively low values of
k.




















Figure 4. Equilibrium ak for k = 1;2;:::;10
In order to have a satisfactory approximation to the innite dimensional dynamics, we
would also like the responses of the endogenous price to aggregate shock to converge. In
Figure 5, the impulse response functions to a persistent (left panel) and transitory (right
panel) supply shocks are plotted for k = 1;3;:::15: We can see that also also the impulse
response converges rapidly and that they do not change much when additional orders beyond
the rst 6 or 7 are added.
Since the impulse response functions to the two aggregate shocks completely describes the
dynamics of the price, convergence of one implies convergence of the other. 6 or seven orders
of expectations thus appear sucient to accurately represent the equilibrium dynamics of theDYNAMIC HIGHER ORDER EXPECTATIONS 29









































Figure 5. Impulse responses of pt for k = 1;2;:::;10
price. Of course, this depends on the parameterization of the model. In general, the more
persistent the supply shocks is, i.e. the closer  is to unity, the more orders of expectations
are necessary. However, it is dicult to nd parameterizations for which more than 10 orders
of expectations are needed.
9. Conclusions
In this paper we derive a method for solving dynamic models with private information.
The principal diculty of solving models in this class is the innite regress of expectations
arising from agents' need to `forecast the forecasts of others'. Here, we demonstrate how
the innite regress problem can be made tractable by imposing some structure on expecta-
tions. Specically, it is common knowledge that agents form expectations rationally. This
assumption allows us to derive the dynamics of higher order expectations explicitly and
transparently.
We use the structure imposed on expectations by common knowledge of rationality to
solve a version of Singleton's (1987) asset pricing model with privately informed traders.
By dening an average expectations operator, we derive an expression for the price of the
asset as a geometric sum that resembles the present discounted value of expected future
fundamentals. The word 'resembles' is used with care to indicate that while the functional
form is similar to the corresponding expression in a full information model, there is an
important dierence since the price function is not derived by relying on the law of iterated
expectations. Instead, the operator is used to compute a convergent sequence of higher
order expectations of future fundamentals. The current price of the asset is given by the
discounted sum of this sequence.30 KRISTOFFER P. NIMARK
Determining the dynamics of higher order expectations and how these map into the price
of an asset does not by it self solve the innite regress problem. However, it does provide
us with a framework that is tractable enough to derive conditions under which the model
can be approximated to an arbitrary accuracy by a nite dimensional state representation.
Incidentally, this is the same condition that guarantees that a stable solution exists in the
full (or common) information case: If the discount rate multiplied by the eigenvalue of the
fundamental process is smaller than unity in absolute value, we only need to model a nite
number of orders of expectations to achieve any required degree of accuracy.
The equilibrium representation derived here can be taken as a literal description of agents'
behavior, i.e. as representing agents who explicitly form expectations about other agents'
expectations. The convergence results derived here can then be comforting for readers who
nd it implausible on cognitive limitations grounds that traders form an innite number of
higher order expectations. Indeed, what has been shown here is that forming only a nite
and even low number of orders of expectations may in some settings be sucient.
An alternative interpretation is to view the equilibrium representation simply as a con-
venient functional form to model agents who have access to to private information and
condition on the entire history of observables. The main advantage of the method is then to
deliver a nite dimensional and time invariant representation of equilibrium dynamics.
The literature has to date produced a wealth of qualitative results derived from the in-
teractions that arise between agents when each individual has access to his own piece of
information. A natural next step is to test whether these qualitative results hold up when
subjected to quantitative scrutiny. The solution method proposed in this paper allows us
to solve dynamic models with private information accurately (and quickly) without making
some of the modeling compromises previously thought to be necessary. In addition, the
method delivers the solved model in a form that can be estimated directly by maximum like-
lihood methods. This paper helps shorten the step from qualitative to quantitative results
by opening up the possibility of using dynamic models with privately informed agents that
are realistic enough to use for empirical work.
While the model here had scalar process as the latent fundamental that traders formed
expectations about, none of the proofs rely on this fact. The method works for a general
vector valued latent process and have been applied both to calibrated macro models, as in
Nimark (2008) Graham and Wright (2010) and to an estimated term structure model in
Nimark (2010).
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Appendix A. Computing the conditional variance
The conditional variance of (ct+1 + pt+1); ; is the variance of investors' forecast error of










































The expression on the second line of (A.2) can be computed by putting the hierarchy of























































































where b P is the one period ahead forecast error covariance matrix associated with the state
space system (A.3)-(A.4). The conditional variance of the sum of the coupon payment and
the price is then given by














Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 4
Lemma 8. The variance of the price pt is niteDYNAMIC HIGHER ORDER EXPECTATIONS 33
Proof. We want to show that E (pt)
2 < 1: Taking variances of both sides of the expression


































The two terms on the last line are nite and given exogenously. We thus need to show that
the innite sums on the rst and second line converge. We will do this by demonstrating
that the absolute values of the covariance term is bounded by the variance of the true supply
process, i.e  cov

t+ijjt;t+jjjt
   E (t)
2 (B.4)


















2  E (t)
2 (B.6)
i.e. that the variance of higher order expectations are bounded by the variance of the true
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(B.10)
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